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Professor Theodore Rave's article Politicians as Fiduciaries is
thoughtful, well-argued, and sophisticated. It identifies the right end-
game and works its way to what we think are some of the most prom-
ising proposals out there for addressing the difficult problem of gerry-
mandering. It also provides the best proof that this debate in election
law has run its course.
We should first say a word about the article's strengths. The criti-
cal insight at the heart of Rave's article is a parallel between corporate
law and election law. The parallel is nonobvious. One of us has spent
a good deal of time telling skeptics why it makes sense for him to teach
both business associations and election law. As Rave recognizes, both
corporate and election law are defined by the agency problem between
a diffuse group of principals, on the one hand, and the officials they
elect to serve their interests, on the other.1 In corporate law, the prin-
cipals are shareholders who elect a board of directors to manage their
corporate entity. In election law, the principals are citizens who elect
public officeholders to run the government. These two superficially
dissimilar bodies of law are thus unified by the same basic regulatory
dilemma. Both pivot off the challenge of governance, public and
private.
Both corporate law and election law must therefore confront the
unavoidable problem of self-entrenchment. Corporate directors and
public officeholders can use the power with which they are entrusted
to insulate themselves from removal. Rave correctly suggests that this
similarity breeds opportunity for intellectual arbitrage. He argues that
election lawyers can borrow from corporate law by relying on the no-
tion of fiduciary duty to think about problems like redistricting. To
spell out his approach, Rave suggests that courts assessing gerryman-
dering claims should either (i) apply "entire fairness" review in which
courts scrutinize whether a redistricting scheme is politically fair; or (ii)
offer certain procedural safe harbors borrowed from corporate law, in-
cluding the use of an independent redistricting commission or a public
vote ratifying the scheme. 2
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What is most striking about the article is that it reveals just how
much of this terrain has already been charted. Election law is already
premised on the notion that the task of reform is addressing the prin-
cipal-agent problem. The notion is so deeply embedded into the field's
DNA that the tribe's most famous "but see" citation is Professor Nate
Persily's contrarian defense of the "foxes guarding the henhouse" (the
phrase we all use to describe the principal-agent problem to laymen).3
The idea may be expressed through different paradigms, the solution
may be modeled on different areas of the law, but for the last two dec-
ades the field has devoted itself to the same task to which Rave de-
votes this article. So, too, the field has come up with the same types of
solutions as Rave does. Virtually all election law scholars worry about
the principal-agent problem. Almost all look to the courts to solve it.
And most ask the courts to intervene on Elysian, representation-
reinforcing grounds. Any problem, of course, looks similar when cast
at a high level of abstraction. But even when one digs down into the
specifics, Rave's arguments are familiar.
Professor Samuel Issacharoff's seminal article on partisan gerry-
mandering, published by this journal in 2002, makes the same kinds of
arguments and proposes an almost identical solution to Rave's. 4
Rave's subsidiary suggestions also represent familiar moves in the
field. Even Rave's suggestion that we borrow from the corporate law
practice of shareholder approval to waive conflicts of interest by re-
quiring popular ratification of legislative redistricting was proposed
back in 2006.s
None of this is meant as a rebuke. It merely confirms just how dif-
ficult reform is in the electoral context. The people who know and
care the most about electoral reform are the politicians who oppose re-
form. This, of course, pushes most academics to do just what Rave
does here - look away from the political process and appeal to the
courts for salvation. Rave's novel insight - and we don't wish to
downplay it in any way - is to draw on corporate law regarding fidu-
ciary relationships rather than antitrust law6 or political theory7 or
common sense.8 He argues, at base, that we require politicians not be
so self-interested by imposing a fiduciary duty upon them. It's a
smart, provocative suggestion, and perhaps Rave's piece will be the
3 See Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judi-
cial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, ii6 HARv L. REV. 649 (2002).
4 See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593
(2002).
5 See Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistrict-
ing Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667 (2oo6).
6 See Issacharoff, supra note 4.
See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 6ol (2007).
8 Everyone else.
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breakthrough article that (finally) convinces the judiciary to act. Re-
districting reformers haven't yet hooked a judicial fish, and maybe
Rave's lure will be more appealing. Or maybe it won't. After all, the
problem has been around for a while,9 the basic concern is deeply intu-
itive, the solution is well within the ambit of what courts do (at least if
John Hart Ely is to be believed10), and litigants have offered courts
nearly every doctrinal hook under the sun.
Still, reading as fine an article as Rave's in as fine a journal as the
Harvard Law Review makes us wish that scholars would devote their
energies to something else. Rather than carefully threading our way
through well-trod terrain in the hope of finding a slightly better trail,
we might do better if we set off into the wild and wooly world outside
the courts and charted a brand new path.
We think it's time to move beyond debates about how best to
frame the problem of entrenchment for a judicial audience. As we've
argued elsewhere," courts may have a role to play in mitigating the
principal-agent problem, but we think the most likely and promising
solutions will come from nonjudicial institutions. The problem with
the courts is obvious. Judges aren't particularly adept at adjudicating
the inherently structural claims at stake in election law cases. They
don't possess the training to judge, let alone manage, politics. More-
over, judges are typically uncomfortable with the relentlessly instru-
mental analysis demanded by a structural approach. It is a trope in
election law cases that courts should not impose their own theory of
politics on our democracy. As a result, even when judges do act, they
often prefer to render highly formalistic opinions in the language of
individual rights.
Rave recognizes these tendencies. He tells us that courts will be
more comfortable with his approach because it doesn't require them to
venture beyond an individual-rights frame1 2 and because it doesn't re-
quire them to impose their own judgments about what constitutes a
healthy democracy. 13
We have our doubts that Rave has finally found a way to persuade
judges to do the right thing. Rave's "entire fairness" review doesn't do
much to shield judges from assessing the health of our democratic pro-
cess. The safe harbors and prophylactic rules he proposes require
judges to make just as normative a judgment as Issacharoff's judicial
9 See DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 17-41 (1992).
10 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
11 Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law Scholarship,
in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 86 (Guy-Uriel E.
Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011).
12 See Rave, supra note i, at 693.
13 See id. at 723-24.
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default rules or any other process-based intervention, 14 and Rave's ef-
fort to claim that politicians owe voters a "duty of loyalty" strikes us as
no more or less an individual right than any other doctrinal hook elec-
tion law scholars have proposed on this front, as Rave acknowledges in
passing.15 It may be that because courts merely need to borrow from
corporate law, they will miss the fact that Rave is asking them to do
precisely what other election scholars have asked them to do - think
structurally about elections and make choices about what constitutes a
healthy democracy. But we think Rave's approach largely boils down
to a question of framing, not substance. Framing matters, to be sure,
and Rave's lawyerly, historically informed approach is surely more
likely to tempt judges than Issacharoff's aggressively instrumental ap-
proach. Nonetheless, at bottom, Rave is still asking the courts to do
essentially what election law scholars have long asked them to do.
And when judges start to think hard about Rave's "hypothetical disin-
terested body,1 6 we wonder how long it will take them to recognize
that fact.
There is a world outside the judiciary, however. There are other
institutions capable of helping us harness the very elite incentives that
currently taint our politics. A burgeoning cohort of scholars has begun
to write about these institutions, to map the terrain outside of judicial
review. There's been an institutional turn in election law,1 7 as academ-
ics have begun looking away from the courts to cure what ails us. In-
stead, they've advocated the creation of process-oriented, self-
enforcing institutions that could prove more durable than reliance on
courts over the long run.
These new institutionalists, as Professor Bruce Cain calls them,18
begin with the same basic premise that has undergirded the field's
longstanding judge-centered approach. They recognize that the prob-
lem of political self-interest is the core problem for the field. However,
the new institutionalists recognize that partisanship is a double-edged
sword. It's the cause of many of our democratic woes, but it also pro-
vides the energy necessary to fuel a vibrant democracy. The key, then,
is to figure out how to align the interests of partisans and self-
interested politicians with the interests of the public, thereby dissolving
the principal-agent problem rather than eliminating it. The key is to
14 See Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1q81); Laurence H. Tribe,
The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 'o63 (1980).
15 See Rave, supra note i, at 721.
16 Id. at 726.
17 See Gerken & Kang, supra note ii.
18 Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 18o8
(2012).
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figure out how to harness politics to fix politics. Sometimes the courts
can help, but more often than not, the solution lies outside the courts.
The new institutionalists, to be sure, haven't figured out how to
solve all of our problems, but at the very least, they have found some-
thing new to say. If courts ever get in the mood for engaging in serious
reform, we have a remarkable number of proposals at the ready, with
Rave's article nicely topping off the pile. But there's a lot more room
to write where the new institutionalists are heading.
